The Cohen Group: News: Op-Eds: NATO Must Prepare for Possible Gaza Call-up


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October 26, 2004 Monday

NATO Must Prepare for Possible Gaza Call-up
By Joseph Ralston
The writer, who served as supreme allied commander, Europe from 2000-2003, is now vice-chairman of The Cohen Group in Washington, DC

As Ariel Sharon, Israel's prime minister, seeks parliamentary approval for his plan to withdraw Israeli troops from Gaza, Nato officials should begin studying how to maintain security in that area. Such planning could be the first step for a larger Nato role in the region.

Why Nato? Initially established to defend Europe, Nato's most important missions so far - Afghanistan and now, training Iraqi security forces - are currently outside Europe's traditional borders. Nato could and should be playing a critical role in bringing greater stability to the Middle East by using its security forces to support a peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Such an agreement is not imminent. But Nato cannot afford to wait. Planning efforts could bolster the momentum and interaction that are prerequisites for peace negotiations. Resolving this protracted conflict will require assurances on security protection. All parties therefore must have security plans ready before reaching a final agreement.

The past decade provides a good insight. Through its "Partnership for Peace" initiative Nato reached out to the former communist countries in the Warsaw Pact to create a framework for co-operation by leading joint exercises, military training and open discussion.

Similarly, a Mediterranean forum established by Nato provides an opportunity to build trust with the Middle East. Through this mechanism, known as the Mediterranean Dialogue, the alliance established formal relationships with Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco. Unfortunately, the Dialogue has not yet realised its potential and should be revitalised along the lines of the Partnership for Peace initiative. This would enable top officials from the seven participating countries to attend Nato meetings, which could call to account government leaders for promised actions not yet taken. Countries, like individuals, are more likely to take necessary but difficult steps if they are accountable to friends and colleagues with whom they know they will continue to meet regularly for months and years ahead.

A fuller dialogue along these lines would lay the groundwork for a stabilising Nato presence in the Middle East. The alliance's military planners could then begin to focus on security arrangements critical for implementing any political agreement between Israel and a future Palestine.

One vital security arrangement would most likely involve deploying Nato troops to the Middle East in sup port of a peace agreement. The Balkans, where Nato peacekeepers have made remarkable progress over the past 10 years, serves as a useful roadmap. As in the Middle East, the populations of Bosnia and Kosovo are of different ethnicities, religions and histories going back centuries. Early on in Bosnia, Nato established zones of separation and explicit rules as to who could be where and what type of arms were allowed, and rigidly enforced these rules. Over time, as the population grew more comfortable with the arrangement, tensions began to ease. Nato planners were able to reduce the zone of separation, remove some Nato troops and encourage the resumption of travel and trade.

On the more immediate challenges faced by Israel's preparations to withdraw from Gaza, Nato could bring the Mediterranean Dialogue countries together to review options for Egyptian peacekeepers working with internal Palestinian security forces to prevent a security collapse in Gaza. While any commitment of Nato forces may be premature, bringing this planning and analytical work under the alliance's umbrella would help jumpstart a process that brings experienced military planners from the US, Europe and key countries involved to the table to consider options from a professional military perspective. Any deployment of troops requires detailed plans, which take time to develop. European and US officials should begin a planning process now to decide whether Nato could help supervise implementation of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Delaying concrete planning until the signing of a political agreement would only create opportunities for those who want to derail the peace process. Top officials on all sides need to talk seriously about Nato's role to assess requirements, tap the expertise of military authorities and gauge the degree of support among Nato countries.

In addition, Nato peacekeeping operations should be considered as an option for the time when an agreement is achieved. With Israel planning to withdraw from Gaza in less than a year, Nato peacekeeping may become a realistic option sooner rather than later. Ultimately, the two sides will have the final decision on whether Nato troops are acceptable. But Nato's member countries must start planning now for this option to remain a possibility. Such a role could be critical for the alliance's future, for the future of the Middle East and for a more stable world.

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