The Cohen Group: News: Op-Eds: On the 9/11 Commission's Report


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August 1, 2004 Thursday

On the 9/11 Commission's Report
William S. Cohen, secretary of defense from 1997 to 2001, is chairman and CEO of the Cohen Group.

The purpose behind creating a national intelligence director (NID) to coordinate all of our intelligence agencies is to reduce or remove the structural "stovepipes" that impede the flow of vital intelligence within and between agencies. The 9/11 commission was right to give this need a high priority — and it was also right to identify the need for agencies to put greater emphasis on sharing intelligence rather than shielding it.

This does not mean, however, that the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence collection will be any less important. Establishing a "joint staff," like the one that currently exists in the Department of Defense, could help meet the twin needs of disseminating and protecting intelligence. Such a staff would also be valuable in planning counterterrorist activities involving multiple participants.

Creating an effective joint staff will be no easy task. Traditions and old habits die hard. It took more than four decades for our military services to conclude that serving on the joint staff was a positive contribution to national security and not a career-ending assignment.

One of my principal concerns about the commission's recommendations is making sure that the NID office, however it is structured, is prohibited from having any advocacy role on operational matters. This is essential if we want to reassure the public that intelligence, which is fundamental to our national security, is insulated against pressure or favoritism. Those charged with collecting, collating and distilling intelligence should not indulge in policy debates. Past examples should remind us of the danger and folly of allowing this.

Here, Congress must be vigorous in the exercise of its oversight responsibilities. And as Congress examines deficiencies within the executive branch, it should give equal weight to the need to reform its own budgetary and oversight processes.

In order to mitigate concerns over the politicization of the NID, I also suggest that the director have a fixed term, rather than be subject to the political fortunes of any given president. The measure of success for an intelligence chief should not rest on a personal bond with the president. The relationship between the two should always be cordial, but above all else, it should be professional.

If we are serious about real reform, we have to contemplate both the intended and unintended consequences of any changes that are made. Arguably, for instance, creating the NID could add just one more layer of bureaucracy over existing processes. But virtually every reorganization of an institution aimed at improving efficiency and decision-making will eventually reveal weaknesses or produce dislocations that will, in turn, need to be reengineered.

The need for thoughtful examination of the commission's recommendations should not be used as an excuse to delay action. The urgency of the commission's findings require us to make haste, but wisely. We cannot afford to temporize in dealing with the threat of terrorism. Whether the commission's recommendations are adopted in whole or in part, it is important that we recognize that old ways have to yield to new demands if we hope to win the long struggle against an implacable, ideological enemy.

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