The Cohen Group: News: Op-Eds: The Mideast Mission


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April 06, 2002, Saturday, Final Edition

The Mideast Mission
William S. Cohen

In a surprise move, President Bush has decided to send Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Middle East on a mission to help end the killing and carnage that have inflamed the region.

To skeptics this may be a mission impossible, to critics one that should not be undertaken. While Israel has taken control over areas that have either supported or harbored suicide bombers, the surge of violence in neighboring Arab countries could threaten the leadership of those friendly to both Israel and the United States. This is not the kind of "regime change" the administration has in mind for the region. The actions of the Israeli military appear to have quelled suicide attacks for the moment, but the White House has concluded that the lack of a cease-fire and other security measures should not preclude initiating political dialogue between the parties. While the terms of a cease-fire are well understood, however, it is far less clear what terms and objectives will be pursued in political talks.

Having just returned from extensive meetings with leaders throughout the Gulf region, I believe that Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal could prove key in framing a political approach that not only makes sense but also actually makes progress. Though old in concept, the Saudi initiative is new in its unanimous Arab League endorsement of a vision intended to appeal to Israeli desires for a genuine peace. But that vision must be translated into specific proposals if it is not to join a long succession of forgotten efforts.

A natural starting point for such specific proposals is the most recent stopping point in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the talks held in Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. This view was advocated strongly by Yasser Arafat after the Taba discussions, and equally strongly rejected by both then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Prime Minister-elect Ariel Sharon, the former on the grounds that Arafat had failed to seize the olive branch he had been offered and the latter because he opposed the substance of Taba.

Given that most of the substance of Taba was offered from the Israeli hand, with the Palestinians seeking to pocket it, the burden for responding to the Arab League resolution rests with the Palestinians. If, as Chairman Arafat stated so vehemently a year ago, Taba is the basis for resumed talks, then the Palestinians can offer Taba as the basis to negotiate implementation of the Arab League resolution — and the Arab League can back that offer. Equally important, the Arab League countries, while eager to condemn Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories, must be as eager to condemn suicide bombings as well, and take action to block support flowing to those intent on making the streets run red with more blood.

The Palestinian Authority can negotiate most territorial issues on its own — for example, land swaps and demarcation lines. Certain issues, however, are beyond its ability to resolve without support from other Arab governments, notably: the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif); the return of Palestinian refugees; and the character of a genuine peace.

On the last point, the Arab League has offered "normal relations," although American analysts note that the actual Arabic text offers ilaqaat taba'iya (natural relations) rather than ilaqaat tatbi'ya (normalized relations), as might have been expected. The Saudis have explained their intent as relations "just like Arab countries have with any other state," although it will be hard for Israel not to recall that Arab states have been known to make war on other states, including each other. Even absent war, the Israelis seek genuine peace, with political, economic and cultural ties, not a cool or cold peace.

Beyond these hard issues, both sides have intangible needs that must be addressed if an agreement is to be achievable, meaningful and sustainable. Palestinians are as grievously wounded internally as externally from occupation and conflict. Dignity has been degraded in so many ways for so long that the young, who by nature focus on the future, have lost the ability to even imagine a future in this world. For their part, Israelis for years have listened to Palestinian leaders proffer peaceful words at the negotiating table only to incite violence in the streets and infuse the next generation with hatred for the very notion of Israel's existence.

In the end, Arabs need recognition of their dignity, while Israelis need the dignity of recognition — and neither is likely to be willing to wait until the end to get it.

The administration hopes to refocus world attention on the terror trail that leads to Baghdad and beyond. Our friends in the region have made it clear that whatever aversion they hold for Saddam Hussein, he remains a menace of secondary concern, one that should be addressed at a later time.

Arab leaders have succeeded in convincing President Bush that U.S. leadership is essential to prevent a regional conflagration. It is up to the administration to press those same Arab leaders, the Palestinian Authority and Israelis to seize the thin reed of hope that still exists to avoid a wider and more destructive war.

The writer, a former secretary of defense, is chairman and CEO of the Cohen Group, an international strategic business consulting firm.

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