The Cohen Group: News: Op-Eds: Huffing and Puffing Won't Do The United States will inevitably need to address some of North Korea's concerns.


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January 7, 2003, Tuesday, Final Edition

Huffing and Puffing Won't Do
The United States will inevitably need to address some of North Korea's concerns.
William S. Cohen

North Korea, in acting to expel monitors and move ahead aggressively with its nuclear weapons program, has presented the Bush administration with a serious problem. The administration is understandably making every effort to play down this challenge as we head into the final weeks of resolving the manner in which Saddam Hussein's regime will be disarmed. However we choose to characterize the situation on the Korean peninsula — as a crisis or simply a major challenge — the options open to the United States, regrettably, run the full gamut from bad to worse. While North Korea has had the makings of one or two nuclear weapons for more than a decade, it could, if left unchecked, build a small nuclear arsenal by the end of the year and rapidly expand it in the coming years.

Meanwhile, the mood of the South Korean people toward the United States has soured. The younger generations either know or care little about our contribution to their current freedom and prosperity. Many view our military presence as an irritant at best and an occupying force at worst. Others, though mindful of America's role in their history, believe we too often act with condescension toward them, treat their political leadership as toadies, and have undermined their efforts to pursue a more open and engaged relationship with their brethren in the North. President-elect Roh Moo-hyun will feel domestic pressure to respond to such sentiments, which aided his candidacy.

The deterioration in our relationship with South Korea further complicates our options in dealing with Kim Jong Il. A preemptive military strike to knock out North Korea's nuclear weapons facilities, while possible, would pose significant risks. The North Koreans have a formidable, million-man fighting force, 70 percent of which is positioned just north of the demilitarized zone, a short distance from downtown Seoul. The United States, if it took such action, would place hundreds of thousands of lives in jeopardy, including those of the 37,000 U.S. military personnel stationed there.

Some prominent political commentators argue that we should reduce our risks and pull all our forces out of South Korea. This would have the effect of telling the South Korean people that they're on their own, while at the same time hinting to the North Koreans that we are prepared to destroy them from a distance without sacrificing large pools of American blood.

Such a proposal has a superficial and chauvinistic appeal, to be sure. But to pull our troops out of South Korea would risk creating a leadership vacuum in the region and cause further destabilization. Domestic pressure would build quickly in Japan, for example, to remove many, if not all, of the U.S. forces stationed there.

If such a vacuum were to exist, several actions of questionable desirability would likely follow. China would certainly seek to fill the void. Japan would either have to contest China's growing military power, including building its own nuclear arsenal, or strike some power-sharing arrangement with the Chinese. The effect would be felt well beyond the region, with India potentially motivated to expand its capabilities in reaction to Chinese stratagems. The economic consequences that would follow from such instability (and potential military conflict), while not immediately calculable, would be significant.

President Bush is right not to want to reward or accommodate North Korea's bad behavior. But diplomacy ultimately involves resolving conflict by making concessions by another name. We will ask the Chinese, Russians, Japanese and South Koreans, as well as the United Nations, to become energetically engaged in convincing North Korea of the dangers of its actions. They will have to make it clear to North Korea that it must give up its nuclear ambitions if it is to have any hope of a better economic and political future. The abandonment of those ambitions will require a degree of international monitoring and verification far in excess of what has been in place to date.

The United States, in turn, perhaps acting indirectly and discreetly, will inevitably need to address some of Pyongyang's concerns. Those who wish to pursue a harder line may see this approach as little more than a diplomatic Kabuki dance, choreographed to conceal what they would consider a policy of appeasement. But huffing and puffing is unlikely to blow down the house of Kim Jong Il or calm the high anxieties of those in the region.

The writer, CEO of the Cohen Group, was secretary of defense from 1997 to 2001.

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