The Cohen Group: News: Archives: 2002: Secretary William S. Cohen's Remarks at the 2002 Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft Forum


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Secretary William S. Cohen's Remarks at the 2002 Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft Forum
[As Delivered]

US-German Relationship Thank you for your kind introduction.

I came to this conference as someone who believes that the relationship between the United States and Germany is of central importance to the peace and prosperity of our two nations.

In business today, as in my years in the Senate and as Secretary of Defense, I travel around the world and have visited more than 100 nations on all six continents, many multiple times.

But in over 30 years of private business and public life, I have come to Germany perhaps more than any other nation.

The shared values of freedom, liberal democracy and equality that our peoples hold dear are the foundation of our relationship.

It is a relationship that sustained us through the dark days of the Berlin Blockade, the Cold War, the push to unification, and the horror of September 2001.

Recent public opinion polls from the United States show that a large majority of Americans think that Germany is of vital interest to the United States and an even larger majority sees the members of the European Union as our most reliable partners in the war on terrorism.

This deep reservoir of trust can sustain our relationship but it cannot do so indefinitely.

Partial Transformation of German Foreign and Security Policy

Germany has begun a dramatic transformation of its foreign and security policy.

I recall proposing at the Wehrkunde Conference in 1994 that German troops participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Macedonia---and was firmly told by leading German experts that it could not happen. At the time a number of security experts argued that German forces could not be deployed on any territory that German troops had occupied during World War II.

I recall when the Foreign Minister sued his own government to prevent German military personnel from participating in NATO AWACS operations over the Balkans.

At the time, I said that Germany cannot hide from history but neither can Germany hide behind history.

Unified Germany is now fully sovereign and has begun to step forward as a full member of the international community.

Today, Germany has
1,000 troops in Central Asia including 220 on the ground in Kabul
1,700 troops in Bosnia in SFOR,
5,000 troops in Kosovo in KFOR,
and was the first nation to lead TASK FORCE FOX in Macedonia with 800 troops.

This is indeed a remarkable political transformation, a transformation that is still in process and as yet incomplete.

Germany must continue to transform itself if it is to complete the process of becoming a ?normal? nation and a leader among nations commensurate with its strong democratic institutions and broad economic influence.

German Defense Transformation Stalled

Less remarkable has been the transformation of Germany?s defense policy and its armed forces.

Yes, Germany has undertaken peacekeeping duties in challenging and dangerous areas. But so do Fiji, the Philippines and Pakistan.

Yes, Germany has pledged in the EU and NATO to improve its armed forces, but Germany?s military capabilities have suffered deeply over the past ten years.

Defense spending dropped precipitously to about 1.5% of GDP, slightly more than Belgium and slightly less than Hungary.

Some will argue that Germany cannot afford to spend more on defense.

I would argue that Germany cannot afford not to ?normalize? its defense policy and enhance its defense capabilities.

Weak Germany Defense Policy Undermines International Organizations on which Germany Relies

Germany for decades has made the development of strong international organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations and NATO the central theme of its foreign and security policy.

For Germany, protecting its security through international organizations was the only acceptable course.

And with strong German support, these institutions prospered.

The expansion of the European Union in 2004 to include 10 new nations is an outstanding achievement and offers the possibility to enhance the already historically unprecedented levels of security in Europe.

This is perhaps the best example of the capabilities of so-called soft power.

Though at times not fully acknowledged in Washington, soft power is an essential element of a complete foreign and security policy.

Soft power is the power to persuade, the power to assist people to raise their standard of living, the power to help people rebuild their war-shattered lives.

But September 11th demonstrated again both the dark side of soft power and also its limits.

Soft power can bring economic growth, investment, increased exchanges, better education and ultimately political liberties.

But some feel threatened by such economic, political and social changes, which, indeed do challenge and change traditional structures of some societies. Some resent those who possess soft power.

And while most opposition takes legitimate forms, fanatical groups can and do arise who advocate radical, simplistic and violent solutions.

September 11th also demonstrated the limits of soft power. In some cases, foes take up hard power to attack us and only hard power can protect us.

So, the EU has demonstrated it can exercise soft power in Europe.

But what can the EU, NATO and the United Nations do beyond Europe? What can they do when soft power is not enough?

Are the EU, NATO and the UN credible organizations for dialogue, preparation and above all ACTION on security and defense issues?

What is Germany doing to strengthen these institutions in which it has invested its security?

Credibility of EU, UN and NATO

European Union

In the European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has led to the European Security and Defense Policy.

ESDP, in turn, has spawned several high-level committees, the development of paper plans, and the making of commitments on headline goals for defense capabilities.

Real capabilities, however, are nowhere in sight and CFSP remains, at best, an institution of soft power.

United Nations

At the United Nations, debate on Iraq is stalled and confused.

The Bush Administration finally heeded sound advice and took to the United Nations Iraq?s repeated violations of the cease-fire agreement that suspended the 1991 war.

Discussion and debate in the United Nations is desirable. But at some point the dance of diplomacy must end. That point has now arrived.

The President has made clear that he believes that UN member states could act under existing international legal authorities and Congressional authorizations.

And, a coalition of the willing?even without a UN mandate?would include the United Kingdom and a number of other nations.

Failure of a new UN resolution will only stiffen the Bush Administration?s inclination to not take important issues to the United Nations.

The UN can only become weaker if the United States withdraws its attention and political support.

And where is Germany?s voice? In January, Germany joins the Security Council and in February, Germany takes over the Chair.

How will Germany use this opportunity to strengthen the United Nations?

NATO

What of NATO?

My good friend George Robertson has laid out the case for the continued health and prosperity of NATO with Germany at its heart.

The Alliance by many measures is stronger, broader and more vital to our collective security than ever before.

Since winning the Cold War, NATO:
? Brought an end to ethnic cleansing and murder in the Balkans,
? Brought membership, security and stability to Eastern Europe,
? Forged ties with Russia and Ukraine that bring regularity, familiarity and purpose to these blossoming relationships,
? And through the Partnership for Peace formed a network of security relationships across Eurasia, with NATO at its core.

When the United States sought to base forces in Central Asia, where US forces had never been stationed before, it was NATO?s Partnership for Peace that had prepared the political and military ground for success.

And I am pleased to see that at Reykjavik last May, we finally killed the ?out of area? debate. NATO can decide to field forces wherever they are required.

NATO Crisis: European Complacency and US Indifference

But I am deeply concerned about the prospects for NATO?s continued role as the leading forum for security and defense, and therefore as a bastion of Germany?s security.

NATO has been in crisis before. Some would say that NATO is in continual crisis.

Some would even say that NATO stays in crisis so it can have conferences in beautiful hotels like this one!

The normal NATO tensions are usually the result of the United States urging its reluctant allies to take action.

Whether perennial US initiatives to increase the defense capabilities of our European allies, or the decision to deploy Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and Pershing II?s in Europe or the decision to deploy troops to Bosnia.

On the US side of the Atlantic, these would be called crises of European complacency.

And yet, the new crisis the Alliance faces is not in Europe but in the United States.

The crisis in the United States is one of looming indifference toward NATO.

It is no secret that the current Administration in Washington was quite wary of NATO?s formal involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

They saw the capabilities of most NATO nations as out of date, Saw NATO?s force structure as undeployable, and Saw NATO?s command structure as bloated and unworkable.

It should be no surprise that the United States built an ad hoc coalition with certain European allies rather than coming to NATO.

The US proposals for Prague are a direct attempt to address these NATO shortfalls.

First, NATO allies need better capabilities for chem.-bio defense, command and control, lift, and interoperability.

Second, NATO needs a rapidly deployable force capable of forcible entry and able to engage the full spectrum of operations.

Third, NATO needs to prune, streamline and rationalize its command structure. Too many of NATO?s numerous commands appear to function more as expensive job programs for senior officers rather than efficient means for executing military operations.

In sum, the United States wants NATO to have the flexibility to respond to any type of contingency including NATO-led missions, NATO-supported missions, instances where NATO members, and perhaps even NATO itself, would be part of a broader coalition of the willing.

Bottom line: The improvement of NATO?s military capabilities, and thus the effectiveness and credibility of the Alliance, depends on Allied governments making specific capability commitments with clear, NEAR TERM timelines.

The key question is what will we have in 6 months, not six years.

The success, or failure, of Allied efforts at Prague will have a decisive impact on US participation in future Alliance military efforts.

We should recall the central issues for the transatlantic alliance during the decades of the Cold War: How to avoid ?decoupling? the United States from Europe,

If the transatlantic relationship is to remain at the core of our security and defense policies, we must all address the security and defense requirements of each other on both sides of the Atlantic.

With the theology of the out-of-area issue out of the way, the real question is can and will our European allies work with us on issues of primary importance to our security beyond Europe?

We know that the United Kingdom can and will.

The issue for the United States is not IF allies will work with us. We know that they will because they share our values, share our vulnerability to the threat, and have the will and capabilities to share the risks.

Can and will Germany?

Recent statements forestalling German participation with European and US troops in potential operations to disarm Iraq?s WMD capability, would appear to indicate that Germany may desire to become again a nation in Europe with a ?special status.?

I would argue that a ?special status? for Germany would not lead to a stronger Europe, a stronger EU or stronger transatlantic ties.

The crisis of looming US indifference is real. The solution lies in Europe, even here, in Germany.

Germany is always concerned about being forced to choose between the European Union and NATO, between its European partners and the United States.

The United States must take care that it does not see every crisis as either an imperative or an opportunity to take military action. But our European friends must take equal care that they not sit on the sidelines offering little more than criticism at the U.S. exercise of military power.

The threat to civilized society is real. It is universal. It transcends all geography, all continents, all oceans. A biological agent released, be it in New York City or in Berlin, will spread like ink on tissue paper. The ease of domestic and global travel will make it virtually impossible to contain.

There is no safe place. There are no rear lines in this war against terror. All of us are on the front lines facing this grave new world. If it is a shared belief that Al-Qaeda, or Islamic Jihad, or any of the other groups have only the United States in the cross hairs of terror, recent events in Bali, in the Philippines, and in Moscow expose this fallacy.

I am not suggesting that the United States is a repository of revealed wisdom or that our proposed actions to combat this threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction should go unquestioned or unchallenged. Debate and criticism lie at the heart of our democracies.

What I do suggest is that the European members of NATO can no longer ignore the threat, or the military requirements to meet it and then complain that the United States treats them with indifference and disdain.

The will to shoulder real responsibility for your security beyond Europe and developing the capabilities to act with your Allies, in the EU or NATO, only strengthens both institutions and your transatlantic ties.

Thank you.

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